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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

EHYIN 0. RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
\VARDEN JOHN W. TURNER,

Case

No.

10164

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEl\lEXT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action in which the appellant brought a
petition for \Vrit of Ifabeaus Corpus which was denied.

DISPOSITION IN" LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged in the Third Judicial Court
in and for the County of Tooele for the crime of indecent
assault, to which appellant entered a plea of guilty. Upon
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said plea, appellant was sentenced to the Utah State
Prison. After serving approxirnately one year, by a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, plaintiff-appellant
attacked the jurisdiction of the District Court for the
County of Tooele to prosecute the crime allegedly committed by appellant. The petition was heard and denied,
from which plaintiff-appellant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE.AlL
Appellant seeks reversal of the ruling of the Honorable Ray Vari Cott, Jr., Judge of the District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, in denying the petition for
writ of habeas corpus.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As set forth in the information (Exhibit 1, R. 7),
appellant was charged with the crime of indecent assault
under 76-70-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, in that appellant purportedly assaulted and took indecent liberties
upon a child under the age of fourteen years. To that
charge, upon the advice of court-appointed counsel, appe1lant entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced and
committed to the Utah State Penitentiary by the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson (Exhibit 2, R. 7) on August 13,
1963.

In the stipulation of facts upon which appellant's
writ of habeas corpus was prPdicated, counsel for Ward-
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John W. Turner and eounsel for appellant stipulated
follows:
" ... if the petitioner were placed on the stand
he would testify on the 25th day of July, 1962,
he had no physical contact with the complaining
witness or the 1ninor Shirl Clarke other than on
Dugway, the place where he was living at the
time or where the petitioner was living at the
time" (R. 16).

and further :
" ... that at the tin1e he was living at 60 A
1£ast Second A venue, which is in Dugway in the
southeast quarter section" (record incomplete, but
should have continued to state "of northeast quarter of Section 9, Township 7 South, Range 8 East"
(R. 17).

It was further stipulated that Exhibit 3 (R. 7) was
a certified copy fron1 the Bureau of Land Management of
a public land order frOin the public domain for military
purposes in the creation of Dugway Proving Grounds,
which was for the use of the Department of the Army,
and which included the area above described (R. 17).
The Stipulation went on to state :
" ... that the State of Utah has never had
ownership (to these lands), that the proprietary
ownership of these lands has remained in the
rnited States" . . . since statehood (R. 17, 18)
and further, that on the date of the alleged crime, the
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subject matter lands were being used for a fort or miltary
garrison (R. 18).
The petition was submitted to Judge Ray VanCott,
Jr., with argun1ent on the law after the aforesaid
stipulation, and from an adverse decision plaintiff-appellant herewith appeals.

POINT ON APPEAL
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER THE ALLEGED OFFENSE AS THE SAME WAS COM-MITTED ON DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS, WHICH WAS
BEING OCCUPIED BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY AS A
MILI'l'ARY FORT OR GARRISON, AND THEREFORE UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS.

ARGUMENT
·The Constitution of Utah, Article 3, paragraph 2,
states:
"The people inhabiting this state do affirm
and declare that they forever disclaim all right
and title to the unappropriated public lands lying
within the boundaries hereof.... "
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, Constitution of the
United States, as it refers to the powers of Congress,
vests in Congress the power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever under the district (not
exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of par-
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t ieular ~tah·~ and tlw <H'<'Pptnn<·t> of Con,oTess becomes
the seat of the govPrmnPnt of thP United States and to
Pxerci~P

like authority OYl'l' all places purchased by the

1·on~t·nt

of tlH· LPgi~latnrP of the State in which the same
~hall ht• for the erection of forts, Inagazines, arsenals,
doel~-yards and other needful buildings .... " (emphasis
atldt•d). Clau~P 18 thereof allows for Congressional
dPlegatory effectuation of these powers by officers and
deparhnents of the federal government .
..Appellant concedes that the instant case varies fr01n
the above cited section of the Constitution of the United
~tatl'S in that under our fact situation the federal government never parted with the proprietary interest in
tlw subjPct matter lands. It is submitted that since exclusive legislative privileges are affixed to the Congress
of the United States in cases of purchase or cession by
individuals or states for the named federal uses, like
exclusive federal jurisdiction should continue in the
United States Courts to administer the laws governing
persons within the boundaries of the named exclusive
jurisdiction areas which were not acquired by cession or
purchase. The law is clear on the immateriality of whether the subject matter plot of ground was being actually
occupied for fortress purposes or residential purposes
\\·ithin the fortress boundaries, Fnited Sta.tes v. Unzeuta,
~s1 r.~. 138, (1930).
Principal cases of record involving the jurisdiction
of a court being challenged in a criminal case where the
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crime ·took place on govern1nental property covered in
the named uses of Constitutional Clause 17, supra, and
where the property on which the purported crime was
committed was not purchased by the federal government
are State v. 'Tully, l\1ontana, 78 P. 760, and United States
v. Tully, 140 Fed. 899, Cir. Ct. Dist. of Mont. Both cases
involve the same fact situation. The defendant who was
charged with the crime of murder, the same having
taken place on the Fort Missoula military reservation
and more particularly on the East half of Section 36,
being one of the sections generally deeded by the United
States Government to the States, to be used for the
.support of common schools. In the state prosecution,
the :.Montana Supreme Court made a very detailed discussion covering the date of the school lands conveyances,
and noted that Montana obtained its statehood subsequent to the general grant and prior to the alleged homicide and, further that the occupancy of the east one half
of the school land section had not been deliberately intended by the Department of the Army to be used as
part of the fort. The Court further noted that the only
attempt at transfer of title to the n1aterial area was the
Act of Congress which granted to the State of Montana
ownership of this section and other school sections. The
Montana Supreme Court after acknowledging that the
Act of Congress vested title in the State in the East half
of Section 36, reasoned as follows:
"It is apparent, therefore, that the United
States granted both title and sovereignty to the
state or it granted neither, for, if the land was
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part of t hP military reservation at the time that
the grant took l.ffPet, so that the title to the same
did not pa~~, the sovt•reignty rmnains in the Unih•d Statt•s so long a~ such condition continues, for
the Congress reservP~ exclusive jurisdiction over
military rt>servations." State v. Tully, supra, 765.
,:\nalogizing the State case reasoning to our own
Con~titution of Ftah, Art. 3, paragraph 2, wherein we
~pPcifically " ... disclai1n all right and title to the unappropriatPd lands ... " within the State of Utah, appellant submits that the Tully case and the reasoning contained therein is sound law to be applied to this case.
It is sub1nitted that the federal case of United States v.
Tulf.iJ, supra, and its reasoning is cmnpatible with the
state case, notwithstanding the different results.
For the benefit of explanation in this brief, after
tlw defendant Tully was discharged for lack of jurisdiction in the :Montana state courts to prosecute, federal
authorities atte1npted to indict the defendant for the
same charge which met with a plea to the jurisdiction in
which the Court noted,
"A n1an being tried for his life, of course, is
not squeamish as to consistency, and, as its power
(the Court's) is directly challenged, it is for this
Court to decide, as did the Supreme Court of
~Iontana, whether it has authority to try the offense charged in the indictment." United States
L~. Tully, supra, 900.
~\fter

setting forth essentially the same facts as did the
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state court, to wit, the initial military occupancy of the
school land section was inadvertent, the ft>deral court
made the following conclusion:
"It will be observed that neither by Act of
Congress nor by authority of the President was
said section (Section 36) ever set apart as a part
of said reservation; that the President did not,
through the Secretary of War or otherwise, in
fact reserve or attempt to reserve this land for
military purposes. These being the only methods
by which it could have been set aside, it must
be held that Section 36 was not at the time of the
state a part of said military reservation and it
was not, therefore, a place within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Unted States." State v. Tully,
supra, 902.
We concede that these two Courts have come up with
diametrically opposed conclusions that one court held
title did not pass until the n1ilitary use was terminated
and the other court held title had passed to the state.
However, it is submitted that the essential question was
the sovereignty of the United States over lands granted
to the state. The common point was title and therefore
jurisdiction. We have in the case on appeal an instance
where the United States has always held title to the
subject matter section of land and has merely withdrawn
public use of this section for the purpose of creating a
military reservation.
Directing the Court's attention, we request you to
take judicial notice of the actions of former Governor
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llt·rlH·rt B. Jlaw, who on ~ovPmber 3, 19-:1:-:1: and by corrt·din~ dPPd on Augn:-;t :.m, 1~J-t5, ext>euted Ly deed of cesHion thP rights of thP ~tatt• of Utah in s01ne 13,600 acres
ut' ~dwolland "'''etions situate within the then-boundaries
of what is now known as Dugway Proving Grounds, re~Prving only to thP ~tate the right to execute civil and
eriminal process on the deeded lands. We contend this
adion to hP in aeeordanee with the jurisidictional law
governing the reinainder of the military reservation.

Appellant concedes that we have no evidence of any
t·ompliance by the nlilitary with 54 Stat. 19, as amended,
40 U.S.C. 255 (1958), which sets forth the requirement
that the l'nited States accept exclusive jurisdiction over
lands acquired by transfer or cession as a condition
pn•et~dent to the acquisition by the federal government
of exclusive jurisdiction. However, from the reasoning
of the two Tully cases, the actions of Governor Maw, the
acknowledgment that the proprietary interest in the
~ubject 1natter section has always been in the United
~tatt·~. and that the action of the Department of the
Interior (Exhibit 3, R. 7) in creating from United States
lands a military reservation or garrison, is sufficient
t>ddence and basis to conclude that this reservation
should be dee1ned under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts. It is con1pletely illogical to assume that
the State of Utah would be without power to prosecute
this case had it been charged as being conunitted on a
ceded school section, but could prosecute had the alleged
offense been committed just across one of these sectional
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lines on withdrawn public lands. The result would be to
create, in effect, a checkerboard type of judicial quandary
for the courts.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the ruling of the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr.,
and grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus releasing
appellant from the custody of Warden John W. Turner
and confinement in the Utah State Penitentiary.
Respectfully submitted,
SUMNER J. HA·TCH &
ROBERT M. McRAE
516 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant
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